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Catching up in the pharmaceutical sector:  












For most developing countries, the creation of a strong indigenous pharmaceutical industry 
and an effective national health care system are primary objectives yet to be attained. Since 
the end of World War II and the ushering in of decolonisation, they have been striving 
towards these ends through appropriate public investment and policy implementation. 
Furthermore, medicines and health care services are essential goods which have to be 
accessible to all. Therefore, catching-up in the pharmaceutical sector cannot be considered 
uniquely in terms of the development of industrial capabilities, but must be defined as a vector 
with at least two components: (i) industrial competence and (iii) availability of and 
accessibility to essential medicines. Industrial capabilities refer to the quantity, quality and 
variety of pharmaceutical products that are produced within a country to satisfy local and 
international demand. A national healthcare system refers to the set of organizations, 
institutions, resources and people within a country, whose primary purpose is to promote good 
health in accordance with the expectations of the population and against a fair financial 
contribution (WHO, 2008). Since a little more than a decade the task of healthcare systems to 
ensure access to medicines has been made more complex by the international homogenisation 
of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes.This refers to the signing of the Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) convention by the member countries of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)
4
. In the above context, the present paper focuses on the first component 
of the catch-up vector and attempts to answer two central questions: What are the 
determinants of catching up in terms of industrial capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector? 
What is the role of intellectual property rights on the catching up process? We use the case 
study method to answer these questions through an examination of the evolution of the 
pharmaceutical sector in three emerging economies: India, Brazil and Thailand.  
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 TRIPS, a product of the last round of GATT negotiations, which took eight years to conclude (1986-1994), was 
initiated by the U.S.A., Europe and Japan. These countries argued that a strong IPR regime is a critical pre-
condition for private investment in research and development, and hence economic growth in all countries. At 
the same time, evidently such a move was designed to increase entry barriers for second innovators from 
emerging economies, which had begun to claim significant shares in international markets. TRIPS made product 
and process patent protection mandatory in all branches of manufacturing, including drugs, effectively 
eliminating the possibility for second innovators in developing countries to produce and sell pharmaceutical 
products through re-engineering. It also homogenized the period of protection to 20 years and banned 
discrimination between imported and domestic products.  




According to the WHO (2004), the production of medicines is highly concentrated in high-
income countries, being 93% in the high income countries and 4.5% in middle income 
countries and 2.6% in low-income countries and middle-income countries (see figure in 
appendix). Furthermore, it divides the developing world into four groups in terms of their 
manufacturing and innovation capabilities. Now, the core component of any drug is the set of 
„active pharmaceutical ingredients‟ or API contained in it. API are then combined and first 
processed into a „bulk drug‟ containing the therapeutic molecule in powder form. Thereafter, 
it is further processed into a „formulation‟ or the final form of the drug in the form of tablets, 
capsules, syrups, injections and plasters etc. The most advanced in terms of catching-up are 
countries with manufacturing capacities in both bulk drugs and formulations as well as as 
nascent innovation capabilities like India and China. Second, there are countries with 
manufacturing capacity in formulations and competence in the production of bulk drugs, but 
relying on imports of API to satisfy their demand. Third, there are countries which have only 
competencies in formulations and packaging of imported products. Finally, there are countries 
which have no manufacturing capacities and are totally dependent on imports of drugs and 
these are mainly situated in Africa. The present paper does not consider the last group, but 
instead tries to understand the process of catching, by studying three different countries in the 
three categories: India in the first, Brazil in the second and finally Thailand in the third.  
The methodology used and subsequent organisation of the paper are as follows. We begin 
with a comparison of the industrial capabilities of the three countries today, in order to have 
an idea of how much they have caught-up. Then we examine their R&D and innovation 
capabilities to gain insight on their potential to catch-up process in the future. Then, we trace 
the evolution of their IPR regimes in order to try to understand the role of IPR on the 
development of industrial capabilities. The authors readily admit that a limitation of the paper 
is its focus on the development of industrial competence without a study of health systems in 
these countries, or the determinants of their performance. The latter is neglected as it is 
beyond the scope of the present study. However, even an examination of the first component 
of the catch-up vector in pharmaceuticals yields some valuable insight on how development 
can be accelerated and social welfare improved. 
 
 
1. How much catching-up? A comparison of industrial capabilities 
1.1. India: Becoming global  
Currently, the Indian pharmaceuticals market ranks 4
th
 in volume and 13
th
 in value in the 
world
5
. The value of its production is estimated to be approximately $4.5 billion
6
 and it 
employs about 5 million workers directly and 24 million workers indirectly. In August 2007, 
the McKinsey group released the report of a year old study indicating that the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry could grow to between 16 and $24 billion by 2015
7
. About 75% of 
the increase in demand is expected to be generated by population and income growth, 
development of private and public insurance schemes and improvement in health 
infrastructure (especially outside of the metropolitan cities). If these projections are realized, 
India would be among the top ten in terms of market value and among the top three in terms 
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of growth of the pharmaceutical sector by 2015
8
. Currently India also has the largest number 
of manufacturing units authorized by the Federal Drug Agency of USA outside of the USA: 
India had 75, Italy 55, Spain 25 and China 27 in 2007
9
.  
According to an extremely comprehensive and well analyzed report of the US Trade 
Commission, the Indian pharmaceutical industry is characterized by “fierce competition and 
high volumes, razor-thin profit margins, overcapacity and declining prices” (Greene, 2007). 
The overcapacity is likely to refer to the small scale sector firms, which supply the big firms 
with bulk drugs and related services and play an important role in holding down prices. There 
are two types of firms in the Indian pharmaceutical industry: organized sector firms (i.e. 
registered under the Factories Act, 1948
10
) and informal sector firms. Currently it is estimated 
that the number of firms in the pharmaceutical sector ranges between 20,000 and 23,000, of 
which about 3000 are in the organized sector. Of the latter about 90% are small scale firms, 
i.e. with a capital of less than $1.25 million. 
As in Western markets, the concentration of firms is not high at the aggregate level, but 
very high in niche therapeutic segments. The share of the top 10 firms in India is about 45%, 
which is very low as compared to the US where the top 10 firms account about 70% of sales. 
However, in niches such as streptomycins and chloramphenicols, the concentration is very 
high, with share of the top 4 firms being 98.6% and 93.1% respectively. There is also 
geographical concentration. For instance, the two states of Gujarat and Maharashtra account 
for 40% of the firms and 43% of production. If we take into account two more states Andhra 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, we cover 60% of the manufacturing units (Pradhan, 2007). 
Dutta (2007) points out that nearly 73% of the Indian market is supplied by Indian firms 
making India the only country in the world besides Japan, which is not dominated by Western 
multinationals. Currently, 9 of the 10 top manufacturing firms in India are local ones. At the 
same time, there are approximately 34 foreign drug companies active in the Indian market 
including 15 of the world‟s largest pharmaceutical multinational companies (Greene 2007). 
GSK-India, a subsidiary of GSK Plc (UK) is the largest foreign pharmaceutical company in 
India and among the top ten supplying 5.9% of the Indian market. 
Eighty percent of the production is in the form of formulations and only 20% remains in 
bulk drug form. Self-sufficiency is almost total in formulation and mostly achieved in bulk 
drugs as well (see figure 1). Exports have been growing steadily since 1990. For the three top 
firms, Dr Reddy‟s Laboratory, Ranbaxy and Cipla, export revenues now account for almost 
half of their total revenues. The main export markets are the USA (which is growing in 
importance), Russia, Germany, U.K. and China followed by Brazil, Nigeria and Canada and 
the main products exported are bulk drugs of various kinds, antibiotics, vitamins and vaccines. 
The imports of pharmaceuticals mainly consist of products imported by foreign multinationals 
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Figure 1. Flows in Indian pharmaceuticals 























































































Source : Indian drugs and manufacturers Association. 
http://www.pharmaceutical-drug-manufacturers.com/pharma-industry-statistics 
 
1.2. Brazil: with industrial capabilities but still technically dependent  
Given its size and its potential for growth, the Brazilian market is a favourite market for the 
top pharmaceutical firms in the world. In 1997, the Brazilian market for medicines 
represented 10.3 billion dollars in value, making it particularly dynamic as compared to other 
developing countries, especially in the Mercosur zone. In 2005, it was the 10
th
 biggest market 
in the world with sales reaching 22.2 billion dollars with a growth rate of xx in terms of value 
of goods produced (Lemos de Capanema, 2006). However, such high growth in terms of 
value is accompanied by a significant decrease in the quantity supplied in markeet (refer to 
figure 2). Hence, the growth in value is not due to an increase in supply but to an increase in 
prices. In fact, the general inflation in Brazil between 1972 and 2005 ranged from 10% to 
100% and there were repeated devaluations.  
In terms of market composition, the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is dominated by 
multinationals supplying about 70% of the local market against 30% by Brazilian firms 
(Cohen, 2000). Market concentration is relatively low. For instance, no firm holds more than 
7% share of the market making the pharmaceutical market one with weak concentration (see 
figure 3), which in turn supports the scissors phenomenon of an inverse relationship between 
value of sales and volume of sales. However, as in India, when we close-in on niche markets, 
the concentration is much higher and prices charged by the leading firms, which are often 
Western multinationals, are much higher than on average (Wogart, 2004). 




Local firms account for 80% of the medicines sold in the Brazilian market in terms of 
volume and 74.6% in terms of quantity. About 20 public laboratories contribute to 3% of 
national production in terms of value and 10% in terms of quantity supplied. The missionse 
laboratories have as their mission to produce essential drugs targeting public health 
programmes (Bermudez et al. 2004). Foreign firms have their production units to satisfy local 
demand, especially Indian generic producers and in totoal foreign firms supply about 10.3%  
of the market for generics.  
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the pharmaceutical market in Brazil (1997-2005) 
 
Source : Lemos Capanema, 2006 from Febrafarma/Depto de Economia, 
reproduit dans Lucia.  
 
Figure 3. Production of drugs and raw material in Brazil (2004) 
 
Source : Fialho, 2005, cité dans Delgado Bastos.  
 
The dynamism of the sector is attested by an increase in the number of firms in the 
pharmaceutical sector even though there have been waves of consolidations and closures. For 
instance, in the 1990‟s more than 2000 local firms shut down because of competition in terms 
of high quality (Sweet, 2007). Employment is also on the rise, going from 74 471 in 1996 to 
95 634 employees in 2004 (see table1). The small scale sector with less than 20 employees 
makes up 64% of the market, while large firms with more than 500 employees account for 








Table 1. Evolution of the number of firms and employees in the pharmaceutical 
industry in Brazil 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of 
firms 





















Source : Febrafarma, 2007 
 
Another important trend is the growth of the generics market. Between 2000-2003 generic 
producers in Brazil invested nearly a billion dollars in the construction and modernisation of 
their firms (Bermudez et al., 2004). Moreover, in 2000-2005, about 1140 new pharmaceutical 
products were granted marketing approval. The generics market increased from 1% of total 
pharma market in terms of both value and volume in 2000 to becoming 10.7% in terms of 
value and 13.5% in terms of volume by 2006 (Pro-Genericos, 2006).  
The growth of the generics market has largely benefitted the incumbent leaders in the 
market (see table 2). About 53 firms operate in the generics market out of which 27 are 
domestic firms and 26 are foreign ones
13
. There are 4 Brazilian firms among the top 10 (EMS-
Sigma Pharma, Aché-Biosintética, Medley et Europharma) and there are foreign firms from 
emerging countries like India (e.g. Ranbaxy) as well as European multinationals (e.g. 
Novartis).  
 
Table 2. Top ten local mufacturers of generic medicines by volume of sales 
and participation in the market in Brazil in 2004 
Company  Volumes of sales (in 
millions of US dollars) 
Percentage of generic 
market share (in %) 
Medley (BRA) 
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2006). Cela s‟explique sans doute, comme dans le cas indien, par le nombre important de petites structures 
opérant dans le secteur.  
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Généricos, available on internet).  




Source : Pro-Genericos, 2004.  
BRA : domestic firms 
 
These achievements however do not compensate for the persistence of „dependence‟ of the 
Brazlian pharmaceutical market on foreign producers. Local Brazilian firms have developed 
competencies in formulation thanks to collaborations with public laboratories which have 
developed technological capabilities in formulations and production of essential drugs. But 
more than 90% of the core substance of drugs, the API are imported from  India or China 
(Sweet, 2007). In fact, only 5 local firms have the capacity to produce API (Sweet, 2007).  
The case of drugs for HIV/AIDS where only the public laboratory Far-Manguinhos and one 
private firm jointly produce the API required serves as a typical illustration (Cassier et Correa, 
2006). Moreover, because these particular API are produced in such small quantities without 
enjoying economies of scale, these API are 94% costlier than those supplied by the Indians or 
Chinese.  
The principal reason for this retard seems to be because Brazilian firms do not invest 
enough to catch up in terms of manufacturing capabilities of API. The latter requires large 
capital investment in equipment and manufacturing installations and must be produced at a 
large enough scale to lower the average costs of production. This is possible only for foreign 
firms.  
A consequence of such dependence is a consistent foreign trade deficit in the 
pharmaceutical sector from 1982 to 2002 except for the years 1983 and 1984. From 1982 to 
2002, Brazilian imports increased by 224% overall, while imports in pharmaceutical products 
increased by 6112% (see figure 4). In parallel, exports of pharmaceutical products increased 
by 1104% while the global exports of the country increased only by 299.4% (Oliveira et al. 
2004).  
 
Figure 4. Brazil’s balance of trade in the pharmaceutical industry, 
1982-2002 
 
Source : Oliveira et alii, 2004, Elaborated from Anuario Estatistico do 
Brazil – FIBGE and SECEX/MDIC. 
 
 





1.3. Thailand: a strong public sector but still technically dependent  
The market value of the Thai pharmaceutical market is 1.32 billion dollars making it the 
33rd largest market in the world. According to the projections of the WHO, it is likely to 
increase by 36 million dollars by 2009 (ISPE, 2006). However, the proportion of locally 
produced drugs has fallen steadily since the last two decades. In terms of value, local 
producers satisfied 65.2% of the market in 1983 but only 43.7% in 2005, with a peak of 
76.5% in 1984. At the same time, imports have gained market share. It is only after 2004 that 
the shares have begun to reverse between locally produced medicines and imports (see figure 
5).  
The above trend is not surprising given that a strong presence of importers and foreign 
distributors marks the Thai market, made up of 486 firms (Wibulpolprasert, 2000). Foreign 
multinationals cater to about 45% of the market, imports take care of another 30%, local firms 
upto 15% and the public organization, the Governmental Production Organization or GPO, 
fills the residural 10%. The GPO produces and distributes essential drugs through public 
health programs.  
There are two possible explanations. First, Thai firms suffer from a technological retard. 
For instance, 96% of API incorporated in locally sold medicines is imported (MOPH-NHSO, 
2007). Less than a dozen firms including GPO produce API, thereby necessitating a 
dependence on imports from multinationals (Kuanpoth, 2006). The dominant activity of local 
firms is simply formulations, and to a modest extent in the packaging of imported drugs. 
Second, the reason can be traced to the nature of demand itself. Consumers seem to strongly 
prefer branded drugs from multinationals to locally produced generics.  
 
Figure 5. Percentage of locally produced and imported drugs, 1983-2005. 
 









2. Future catching-up: A comparison of innovation capabilities 
2.1. India: R&D only for big firms and behind Western firms 
After the 1980's, market leadership in the Indian pharmaceutical market was bestowed only 
to firms with competence in chemical process technologies necessary to re-engineer targeted 
drugs. The knowledge base of Indian pharmaceutical firms was firmly embedded in organic 
and synthetic chemistry and any R&D investment was specifically targeted to lower the costs 
of production of selected drugs identified as having good commercial prospects, with the 
outlays just to the point needed to arrive at the objective (Ramani, 2002). In 1992, only about 
47 companies, out of 23,000 odd firms in the pharmaceutical sector, registered positive R&D 
expenditures, of which only 7 companies spent more than 1.5% of their sales revenue on 
R&D. Thus, the common features of technological capabilities and strategy among all the 
leading firms included low R&D intensity, innovation focus on cost-efficient or quality 
enhancing processes and direct commercialization of innovation in countries where the 
product patent regime was not recognized.  
Western multinationals contributed very little to innovation creation in India. Between 
1970 and 1995 only two multinationals in India (Ciba-Geigy and Hoechst) had more than 2 
patents list in the USPTO.  
TRIPS represented a shifting of incentives for a firms in India, only allowing it to compete 
to become a first innovator and eliminating the possibilities of earning rent through being a 
second innovator. But given the retard of the pharmaceutical firms in crucial areas like 
biotechnology and lack of funds for R&D investment there was a real concern about whether 
TRIPS would undermine the innovative and industrial capacity of the thriving Indian 
pharmaceutical sector. This concern iswas expressed not only by Indian firms but also by 
Indian civic society, which was worried that TRIPS may have a deleterious effect on access to 
future innovations that could include essential drugs.  
A study based on interviews just prior to TRIPS enforcement revealed that pharmaceutical 
firms were adopting one or more of three types of strategic positioning in response to TRIPS 
(Ramani and Maria, 2005). First, the target for R&D is the creation of drugs, vaccines and 
diagnostics that are off-patent or are soon to be off patent, especially in regulated Western 
markets. Second, Indian firms are vying to participate in the international division of labour 
for the creation of new drugs by Western multinationals by offering contract research and 
custom manufacturing services, bioinformatics services for genomics based drug research, 
and carrying out clinical trials. Third, and in a smaller measure, some Indian firms are 
investing in the creation of new drugs for global diseases such as diabetes. Gehl Sampath 
(2006) also notes that the objective of the leading firms is to find the right mix of competition 
and collaboration with the multinationals in order to develop their dynamic capabilities. 
The rationale behind these choices is of course quite clear. The comparative advantage of 
Indian companies is in reverse-engineering and process improvements that lowers the price of 
generics. The US market is the largest single-nation market for generics in the world and 
along with other lucrative European markets they are even larger. Leveraging the rents to their 
reverse-engineering capabilities by selling to these markets is a prime example of picking the 
low hanging fruit – and one that totally escaped prediction in the economics literature on the 
impact of TRIPS in India.  




The other two strategic choices involved the development of new technological capabilities 
in new product and process innovations more linked to the different steps in the sequential 
process of bringing a new drug to the market. The launch of a new drug typically has to go 
through the stages of basic research, identifying the appropriate active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, combining these novel ingredients into a product, performing preclinical and 
clinical trials to test impact, identifying the right dosage and drug delivery system, seeking 
regulatory approval through completing a number of procedures, and finally marketing the 
new drug. Indian firms developed skills in the middle stages and the marketing but not in new 
drug discovery research techniques or preclinical or clinical trial methods. For Western firms, 
which are proficient in all the above steps but need to speed up and cheapen the drug 
discovery process, the presence of Indian firms proficient in reverse-engineering offers 
outsourcing opportunities. For Indian firms aspiring to become new drug manufacturers the 
task is rather more daunting. They have to develop absorptive capacity and technological 
capability in creating drugs, performing preclinical and clinical trials and seeking regulatory 
approval. Finally, they also have to build new capabilities to market new products through 
physicians in Western hospitals. 
Thus, the second choice of strategy viz. becoming a cog in the wheel of an international 
division of labour and helping Western multinationals create their innovations is like the 
helping hand sought by a poor relative. Indian companies realise that they cannot match the 
deep pockets of Western multinationals as far as R&D budgets are concerned but want to 
avoid exclusion
14
. By partnering with Western MNEs in latter‟s new drug discovery 
endeavours, they hope to build new dynamic capabilities.  
The third choice for innovation creation through new drug development, involves head-on 
competition with existing pharma majors and is clearly the road least travelled by Indian 
pharmaceutical firms for two reasons. First, high innovation rents can be reaped in Western 
markets for generics with more certainty. Another more important reason is the lack of 
significant complementary competencies required to create a new drug and get regulatory 
approval from agencies in developed countries. The drug development process starts with 
preclinical tests on animals on the basis of which a firm applies for an Investigational New 
Drug Application (INDA). At this stage the drug development process enters into a series of 
clinical testing phases, at the end of which a New Drug Application (NDA) is made with the 
regulatory authority. Then in order to enter the market some additional information and 
technical support may need to be provided to the regulatory authority and such requirements 
vary from country to country
15
. In the pre-TRIPS period, Indian firms largely skipped the 
INDA, phase I, phase II and phase III of clinical trials and went straight to the regulatory 
authorities for an NDA to prove bio-equivalence of the generic form of the drug and to satisfy 
the additional requirements to market the generic in India. Sometimes, even patents were not 
necessary. Thus, lack of competencies in the initial and final phases of new drug development 
are the Achilles heel of Indian firms. 
Aggregate data however confirm the intentions of Indian firms to upgrade their 
technological ability. By 2005, about 109 pharmaceutical companies had positive R&D 
expenditures; out of which 81 had an R&D intensity of 1.2% and 28 firms had an R&D 
intensity of 8.79% (Chaudhuri, 2007). Yet, even by 2005 no Indian company had come up 
with a significant innovation in the form of a new drug based on indigenous R&D. Pradhan 
(2007) confirms that small firms spend either 0% or less than 1% of sales revenue on R&D. 
                                                 
14 Chaudhuri notes that the sum of the R&D expenditure of the top 11 companies in India million in 2005-2006 was $379, 
while that of Pfizer was almost 20 times more at $7440 million (2007, p. 6). 
15 In India the regulatory authority for the pharmaceutical sector is the Central Drugs Standard Control Organization. 




And there is still a great technological retard in recombinant technology or 
biopharmaceuticals.  
 
2.2. Brazil: a committed public sector 
Since 1992, there has been a significant augmentation in the number of patent applications. 
Oliveira et alii (2004) note that patent applications increased from 28 to 1640 between 1992 to 
2002 with a peak in 2000, with  Western multinationals accounting for most of the increase 
(see figure 7). American firms led the patent applications game with 140 patent applications 
over 1992-95 under the weaker patent regime and 2884 patent applications between 1996 and 
2002, under the stronger patent regime (see figure 8). Germany, France, UK and Switzerland 
come behind the USA. Patent applications by local firms increased from 0 to 283 between 
these two periods but remain insignificant vis-à-vis those by the multinationals.  
 
Figure 6 : Chemical patent claims filed by the pharmaceutical 
industry, Brazil, August 1992-December 2002 
 
Source : Oliveira et alii, 2004, Elaborated from patent file data in 
RPI/INPI.  
 
Figure 7 : Chemical patent claims in the pharmaceutical industry by country 
of origin, Brazil, Periods August 1992/December 1995, January 
1996/December 2002 
 
Source : Oliveira et alii, 2004, Elaborated from patent file data in RPI/INPI.  
 
Oliveira et al. (2004) observe a nearly 33% decrease in contracts between local firms and 
foreign ones between 1992 et 2001 (see table 3). The most favoured form of technology 




transfer during this stage was „licensing of brand-name‟ rather than „joint-venture‟ or 
„mergers‟. Furthermore, licensing decreased from 94% to 34% by the end of the period 
because foreign firms prefered to export to more open markets rather than license their brand-
name to local Brazilian firms. However, „technical assistance services‟ seem to be rising.  
 
Table 3. Technology transfer contracts in the pharmaceutical industry, 
Brazil, 1992-2002 
 
Source : Oliveira et alii, 2004, Elaborated from data published in RP/INPI. 
Type of contract : BNU – License for brand name use ; FRA – Franchising ; TS – Technology 
supply ; PE – Patent exploitation ; R&D – Research and development ; TAS – Technical 
assistance services. 
 
Cooperation in R&D between Brazilian and foreign firms also remains marginal. Most of 
the R&D in pharmaceuticals is carried out by public laboratories and the R&D investment by 
Brazilian firms is very low. In 2005, the R&D expenditure on pharmaceuticals within the 
geographical territory of Brazil touched 125 millions de dollars (Lemos Capanema, 2006). 
The „Brazil National Development Bank (BNDES)‟ is in charge of providing financial 
support for the R&D programs, modernisation of production units and mergers and 
acquisitions by Brazilian firms. The low level of activitiy of the BNDES is gauged by the fact 
that between 2004 et 2007 it financed only a dozen R&D projects (Sweet, 2007).  
Public laboratories are very active in natonal research programmes. In particular, Far-
Manguinhos participated in the conception and design of new treatments for HIV/AIDS, with 
the help of other public institutions. Finally, the research carried out by the Federal University 
of Rio de Janeiro cobmined with the development activities Far-Manguinhos gave rise to the 




2.3. Thailand: Technolgy transfer not much of a help 
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 Comme le suggèrent très justement Cassier et Correa, le développement de compétences en formulation 
développées sur la base du reverse-engineering et le learning by copying expliquent pour beaucoup l‟implication 
aujourd‟hui de Far-Manguinhos dans le champ de R&D. Sans cette phase de dissection, d‟analyse et de 
reproduction des molécules existantes, somme toute d‟apprentissage, cette unité ne serait pas capable aujourd‟hui 
de coordonner des programmes de R&D dans le champ du VIH/Sida.  




The available data, which is not much to start with, indicates that local firms and the GPO 
do not invest much in R&D (Kuanpoth, 2006). However the GPO does invest in development 
activities related to known medicines. For example, it conceived of a HIV/AIDS drugs 
cocktail, the GPO-VIR, composed of three medicines patented seperately before 1992 by the 
multinationals (Guennif et Mfuka, 2003). Similarly, some public institutions such as 
university laboratories carry out R&D to valorize traditional knowledge. However, due to lack 
of resources, this investment rests marginal.   
Given the absence of significant R&D investment by local organizations, technology 
transfer from Western multinationals emerges as a possible source for the creation of 
technological capabilities. According to a study by Supakankunti et al. (2001), there has been 
very little increase in FDI in Thailand since 1992 (see table below).  Furthermore, another 
survey study revealed that 82% of the directors in the pharmaceutical  industry are of the view 
that very little technology transfer has taken place and multinationals simply try to exploit the 
capacity of formulations of national enterprises without promoting technology transfer. 
(Supankankunti et al., 1999).  
There are a number of reasons for the fall in FDI in Thailand. 
First, neighbouring countries offered a better business climate. Dhanarajan (2001) notes 
that a number of R&D intensive multinationals in fact relocalised their Thai offices to 
Singapore despite the reinforcement of the patent law in Thailand.  The argument advanced by 
Professor Chitman, Executive Director of the Pharmaceutical Producers Association (PPA)
17
, 
is that Singapore offers more incentives than Thailand : lower corporate taxes, rapid 
registration procedures, easier work permits for expatriates (Dhanarajan, 2001). Other firms 
relocalized their activities to countries where labour costs were lower such as Vietnam 
(MOPH, 2006). 
 
Table 4. New medicines and foreigner direct investment in Thailand (1992-1998) 
Year 
Valeur de la part détenue par 
les propriétaires thaïlandais 
(baht) 
Valeur de la part détenue 
par les propriétaires 
étrangers (baht) 
Total (baht) 
1992 16 597 800 3 002 200 19 600 000 
1993 105 507 000 93 000 105 600 000 
1994 150 050 020 31 049 980 181 100 000 
1995 36 160 000 11 540 000 47 700 000 
1996 212 182 200 129 017 800 341 200 000 
1997 39 240 000 2 760 000 42 000 000 
1998 138 782 870 4 359 000 143 142770 
1992-
1998 
698 519 890 (79.4)
 
181 822 880 (20.7) 880 342 770 
1992-
1996 
520 497 020 (74.9) 174 702 980 (25.1) 695 200 000 
Les valeurs entre parenthèses sont en %.  
Source : Supakankunti et al., 2001.  
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Multinationals saw no need to increase FDI because they preferred to import from their 
home countries rather than invest in local production. This is also the reason for the increase 
in imports since 1992. Mostly when multinationals engaged in production it was in the final 
stage of formulations, importing API from home countries.  
Another significant factor is market size. The Thai market is smaller in size than the 
Brazilian, Chinese or Indian ones. Given a small market size there is little incentive for 
multinationals to establish their production units in a sector where the economies of scale play 
a critical role in the localization strategies. It is in the interests of patent holders to import 
finished products or just do the final stages of formulations in the country concerned.  
Finally, often the local organizations did not find offers of technology transfers to be win-
win prospects. According to, Krisana Kraisintu, a previous director of the R&D unit of the 
GPO, multinationaux are only interested in making use of the comptencies of local firms in 
formulations in order to reduce their own costs of production and marketing. There is usually 
very little scope for real  technology transfer or technical assistance in collaborations with 
multinationals. As an illustration, one can cite Boehringer, which proposed a license to GPO 
to produce Névirapine (a drug against HIV/AIDS) in dry syrup for children, a product 
patented in Thailand, as the multinational was aware that GPO was technically capable of 
producing the same. The government agency refused. Then in order to benefit from the 
distribution network of GPO, Boehringer proposed to GPO to be the distributor of Névirapine 
in Thaïland.  
 
3. Role of IPR 
3.1. India: Vive re-engineering 
Just after independence in 1947, in India, there was no pharmaceuticals industry to speak 
of. Thereafter, during the 1950s and 1960s, a pharmaceutical sector developed, consisting 
mainly of western pharmaceutical giants and Indian public sector mammoths. However, even 
the Indian public sector combined with western pharmaceutical companies could not cater to 
the demands of the Indian population. Moreover, in order to ensure access to drugs, the 
government pegged prices at affordable levels, lowering incentives for the expansion of the 
production base. In short, there was a crisis in terms of provision of healthcare.  
There were two possible solutions to this healthcare emergency. Either medicine could be 
imported in large quantities as essential commodities or incentives could be provided for the 
development of the local pharmaceutical industry by loosening IPR. The Indian government 
opted for the latter solution. Following the strategy adopted earlier by Japan, China, Russia 
and eastern and southern Europe, the existing IPR, the Indian Patent and Design Act of 1911 
was changed. From 1970 onwards, instead of granting both process and product patents, the 
new IPR regime began to recognise only process patents.  
The Indian Patent Act of 1970 thus constituted a „narrowing‟ of the IPR regime (in 
opposition to TRIPS), increasing the incentives for Indian firms as second innovators. The 
impact of the change in IPR was simply tremendous. Many Indian pharmaceutical firms were 
able to produce essential drugs like antibiotics with a heavy slashing of prices. Indian 
consumers revealed themselves to be price sensitive rather than being brand loyal to western 
brands. The market shares changed tremendously, bearing witness to the downfall of the 
previous market leaders, mainly western multinationals. Most importantly, the public Indian 
healthcare system was finally able to stand up on its feet and there was a significant increase 
in the proportion of the poor who had access to basic drugs. Indian firms even entered into 




production contracts with the original multinational inventors, permitting them also to enjoy 
lower costs, and a greater mark-up. India became an exporter of bulk drugs and final 
therapeutics, supplying many parts of the developing and developed world at lower costs.  
Table 5 below shows the top ten companies for selected years 1970, 1996 and 2003, and 
they clearly reveal what a weaker patent system can do to spur competition. It allowed Indian 
firms to adopt „duplicative imitation‟ and „creative imitation‟ as strategies for technology 
capability development (Kale and Little, 2007). The growing strengths of the domestic firms 
are reflected in the table, in which the figures in parentheses indicate the market shares to each 
firm. Thus, in 1970, the Indian market was clearly dominated by multinational firms and eight 
of the top ten firms were MNCs. After two decades following the 1970 Patent Act, Indian 
pharma was dominated by domestic firms and only 4 of the top ten firms were now 
multinational. By the mid 1980s most Indian pharmaceutical firms were producing bulk drugs 
and formulations for the domestic market and the leading domestic firms (e.g. Ranbaxy) had 
begun to explore markets in Asia and Africa.  
The Indian case study shows that in a developing country, with an excess demand and a 
significant technological retard in a knowledge intensive sector, a narrowing of the IPR 
regime can serve to create industrial competence and also increase welfare. This is of course 
provided that the national system of innovation, including the existing scientific and 
technological competencies, is so developed as to permit the local firms to emerge as second 
innovators. The case study also shows that a narrowing or a loosening of the IPR might be 
welfare enhancing, if it leads to a greater quantity being produced and/or a lowering of price 
in the final market. It might be welfare enhancing even at a global level, if other developing 
countries are able to thereafter obtain the generic versions of the knowledge intensive 
commodity more easily or at lower prices.  
 




Table 5: Top ten pharmaceutical companies in India from 1970 to 2003 
Rank 1970 
Company 








(Market Share in %) 
1 Sarabhai (4.97) Glaxo-Wellcome* 
(4.97) 
GlaxoSmithKline* (5.6) 
2 Glaxo* (2.9) Cipla (2.98) Cipla (5.5) 
3 Pfizer* (2.6) Ranbaxy (2.67) Ranbaxy(4.7) 
4 Alembic (2.6) Hoechst- 
Roussel*(2.6) 
Nicholas Piramal (3.4) 
5 Hoechst* (1.7) Knoll Pharma* (1.76) Sun Pharma (3.1) 
6 Lederly* (1.7) Pfizer* (1.73) Pfizer* (2.7) 
7 Ciba* (1.6) Alembic (1.68) Dr. Reddy‟s (2.6) 




Zydus Cadila (2.5) 
9 Parke Davis* (1.5) Lupin Labs (1.56) Abbott* (2.3) 
10 Abbott* (1.5) Zydus-Cadila (1.51) Aventis – includes merger with 
Hoescht * (2.2) 
* indicates a multinational firm  
Source: OPPI, 2000, 2003; Lanjouw, 1996.  
 
The 1990s saw a number of changes to the regulatory environment facing Indian pharma 
firms. In 1991, the economy was liberalised and the pharmaceutical sector was de-licensed. In 
1995, 50% of the drugs were also removed from price control and by 2004 only 76 drugs 
(26%) remained under price control
18
. Liberalisation of national and international financial 
transactions followed in 1995. Production, exports and imports shot up after the adoption of 
economic reforms (see figure 1). The industry grew rapidly in the 1990s, with an average 
industry growth rate of about 15% for bulk drugs and 20% for formulations (OPPI, 2001). 
Hot on the heels on liberalisation, India became a member of the WTO in 1995 and thereby 
agreed to change the regulatory framework in accordance with the TRIPS convention, a 
mandatory condition for WTO membership. Between 1994, when TRIPS was signed by India, 
and 2005 when it came into effect in India, three amendments to the patent law of 1970 were 
passed in the Indian Parliament to make it TRIPS compliant. They were the „Patent First 
Amendment Act‟ in 1999, „Patent (Second Amendment) Bill‟ in 2002 and the „Patents 
(Amendment) Bill‟ passed in 2005.  
The decade preceding TRIPS was also marked by technological upheavals and radical 
regulatory reform in Western markets. Policy makers in Western countries also became more 
sensitive to the need for developing the market for generics drugs, in order to bring down the 
costs of providing health care and decrease social security payments to its citizens. Ironically, 
these concerns were quite similar to those which had provoked the Indian Patent Act of 1970.  
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The USA pioneered new policies designed to decrease spending on medical care and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984 to stimulate the market for generics, lower prices and 
enable greater accessibility to healthcare for its citizens. Prior to this law, a generics producer 
could not apply for marketing approval until after patent expiration and had to submit the full 
experimental and clinical data as is required for a new drug to prove safety and efficacy. This 
delayed market entry by as much as 3 years after patent expiry. With the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
manufacturers of generic drugs no longer had to go through a lengthy period of extensive 
clinical trials - demonstration of bio-equivalence was sufficient to acquire marketing approval 
for a generic drug. European countries followed suit but the situation remains confusing as its 
national laws remain different.  
Just as the Indian patent law of 1970 had made the pharmaceutical market more 
competitive, the legislation to make entry into the generics market easier in Western markets 
beckoned new entrants from India such as Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy‟s Laboratories. Ranbaxy 
was the first company to spot the opportunity offered by the US generics market and started 
preparations to enter it long before liberalisation and TRIPS. It was also the first company  to 
use the ANDA filing route to enter the US generics market directly. It used the steady but low 
return Para 1 to Para III approach of ANDA fillings, where the generic manufacturer enters 
the market only after expiry of the product patent and securing a niche in the US antibiotics 
segment. on the other hand, Dr. Reddy‟s Laboratories adopted the more aggressive strategy of 
Para IV filings, invalidating existing patents or producing non-infringing process through a 
costly process of litigation. In 2001, DRL became the first Indian company to launch 
Fluoxentine (a generic version of Eli Lilly‟s Prozac) with a 180 day market exclusivity in US. 
This marketing success was followed by the launch of Ibuprofen tablets 400, 600 and 800 mg 
in the US under its own brand name, in January 2003. The success of Ranbaxy and 
Dr.Reddy‟s spurred other Indian firms to attempt to enter the US generics market. 
Another recent trend among the leading pharmaceutical firms is internationalisation either 
through initiation of strategic alliances with Western companies, with the Indian firm being 
the first mover, or through outright buy-outs. While more strategic alliances have been forged 
with US companies, there have been more acquisitions in Europe (Greene, 2007). 
 
3.2. Brazil: Overdoing it with TRIPS 
At the beginning of the last century, Brazil was characterized by a strong IPR regime 
granting both process and product patents. However, incentives were provided for second 
innovators from 1945 by limiting patentability to processes only and this was further 
reinforced from 1969 with patents being entirely prohibited in the pharmaceutical sector 
(Frischtak, 1989). Under pressure from the Commerce Department of the United States 
Government, from 1991 onwards there was a reflection on how to reinforce the IPR regime. 
Without even making use of the clause permitting Brazil to implement TRIPS by 2005, Brazil 
proceeded with a new reinforcement of its patent regime in 1996 with the ratification of 
TRIPS
19
. By a Presidential decree both product and process patents with a 20 year validity 
period were reintroduced.  
With respect to the flexibilities embedded in TRIPS, on the one hand, Brazil restricted its 
ability to use parallel imports by introducing the principle of « National exhaustion of 
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was the target of commercial sanctions from the United States from the end of the 1980s and was under the 
threat of “Special 301” sanction right from 1988.  Consequently the tariffs on certain Brazilian products such as 
electronic items and certain drugs, exported to the US increased (Wogart et Calcagnotto, 2006).  




rights ». Unlike in “regional or international exhaustion of rights” that permits a country to 
imports drugs from countries where they are sold at the lower price, under national exhaustion 
one can buy from the lowest bidder only within the country. Therefore, it is difficult to fight 
against oligopolistic or monopolistic fixing of prohibitive prices or market rationing through 
insufficient production.  
On the other hand, Brazil put in place regulation that permitted it to make full use of 
compulsory licensing, a policy tool by which the State can authorize a local company to 
produce a copy of a patented drug through procurement of a license from the original 
innovator, in the case of a national emergency. Whenever local production was not started by 
a foreign supplier within three years, Brazilian law permitted the octroi of a compulsory 
license
20
. Such a move led to heated debates and a renewal of “Special 301”
21
 and a 
deposition of a complaint by the USA to the « Dispute Settlement Body » of the WTO in 
2001. It was argued that it constituted discrimination to foreign suppliers, a practise not 
permitted under TRIPS. However, the USA eventually withdrew this complaint once Brazil 
pointed out that such a clause also exists in US legislation. Brazil committed itself to 
informing the US agencies whenever it intended to impose a compulsory license on any 
supplier.   
Over time, Brazil progressively refined the conditions under which compulsory licenses 
could be issued. At first, the law of 1996 limited the scope of imports under compulsory 
licensing by establishing the rule that a drug be imported only from a country, where it was 
marketed by the patent holder or by authorized third parties. This meant that imports could not 
be had from a country where the original innovator had not deposited a patent. For instance, 
Brazil could not import drugs from generic producers in India, because the original innovators 
had not deposited a patent in India. Under the Doha Déclaration of 2003
22
, signatories of 
TRIPS can take measures to ensure accessibility to essential drugs. For instance, a country 
which does not have the technological competencies or manufacturing capabilities to produce 
a certain drug, can issue a compulsory license to a firm located in another country to produce 
and supply a drug. In order to remove such constraints the Brazilian law was changed in 2003, 
authorizing imports of drugs that could not be locally produced, from countries in which the 
drug was not patented. Thereby, Brazil was able to import less costly drugs from India, which 
were often also more user friendly, reducing the risk of resistance and therapeutic failures. For 
example, in the case of HIV/AIDS, the Indian generic cocktail reduced intake from 12 tablets 
per day to 2 per day.  
Furthermore, Brazilian law recognized the Bolar principle contained in the Patent laws of 
the USA and TRIPS that provides incentives for the early entry of generics. Using the Bolar 
provision of TRIPS, countries can fine-tune their IPR so that local firms have the possibility 
of investing in R&D to develop competencies in formulation and production of a patented 
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 This is similar to the notion of « working patent » that was present in the Thai and Indian patent legislations till 
1992 and 2005 respectively. Expliquer plus ….  
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 The policy « 301 special » is a tool utilised by the United States since 1984 to exercise commercial pressure on 
countries with practises that pose a risk to the economic interests of the USA through the adoption of standards 
judged inadequate in the realm of IPR. This tool has been repeatedly denounced by the WTO because it is 
considered to be illegal as it violates the principle of multilateral resolution of disputes after submission to the 
“Disputes Settlement Body” of the WTO.  
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 Following objections raised by African countries which declared that they could not benefit from the 
application of compulsory licenses as they did not have manufacturing capabiltiies, the Ministerial conference of 
the WTO at DOHA in 2001 commanded the TRIPS council to find a solution by 2002 end. By August 2003, 
some months after Cancun, a solution was found: an additional flexibility was introduced by the member nations 
so that countries without manufacturing capabilities could import from generic producers with compulsory 
licensing.    




drug. They can also be allowed to initiate administrative procedures for obtaining marketing 
approval of generic so that the generic can be introduced in the market as soon as the patent 
for original drug expires.  
With respect to protection of data on clinical trials, TRIPS gives leeway simply 
requesting member countries to initiate legislation to protect against „unfair commercial use‟ 
and in response Brazlil has put in place a dual system. For new chemical molecules the 
protection is assured for 10 years
23
. For the molecules, which are not new, embodying a minor 
amelioration, the protection will be for five years. In practice, it signifies that if the patent has 
expired for a drug but the clinical trials data is still protected, the firm which desires to 
produce a generic cannot use the clinical trials data of the original patent holder to constitute a 
dossier for gaining market approval. In other words, the concerned firm has to re-do new 
clinical trials to demonstrate its efficiency and the innocuity of the generic or me-too version, 
calling for replication of effort and costs and leading to high final market prices.  
In addition to these principal modifications of the Brazilian system of patents, there were 
another series of modifications in the regulation the affect the final market prices and the 
quality of drugs supplied in terms of its gave importance quantity and quality of drugs 
available. In fact, at the moment when Brazil was defining step by step the main framework of 
the new IPR regulation in the pharmaceutical sector, in parallel it invested considerable effort 
to satisfy the health needs of the population, via focussing on the question of ensuring an 
adequate supply of essential drugs.  
As with a number of developing countries subjected to liberalisation measures, opening 
and deregulation of markets as ordered by the IMF
24
 during the 1990s, inflation soared in 
Brazil and its currency was repeatedly devalued. This translated into a difficult access for 
medicines. The increase in prices provoked irreguler intake of medicines among the poor 
sections of the population, which in turn contributed to the building up of disturbing 
resistence to available treatments.   
In order to rectify these perverse effects, the public agencies put in place a formal system 
of public bidding via the law called „Law of Tenders‟ in 1993. In order to promote 
competition and improve the access to medicines, public procurements representing 26% of 
domestic market sales was channelled through „open auction‟ procedures (Sweet, 2007)
25
. 
Only market price was taken into account without much attention being paid to quality.  
The „Basic pharmacy program‟, whose objective was to improve access to 40 essential 
medicines, was initiated in 1997, in conformity with the constitutional right of Bralians to 
health. One of the first measures taken was the dissolution of the national agency CEME 
which was created in 1971. This institution had as its mission the coordination of the 
production and distribution of drugs produced within the country, especially those produced 
in the public laboratories (Jorge et al., 2004). But charges of corruption and failure to meet its 
objectives led to this decision
26
.  
Immediately, a research group was constituted by the Ministry of health to define the main 
framework of a national policy on drugs. A report edited in 1999 enunciated its principal 
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 This protection of data on clinical trials for a duration of 10 years is also included in most bilateral free-trade 
agreements signed between the USA and countries of the South (Guennif, 2006, Rossi, 2006).  
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 In the Brazilian case, the opening of the markets and the liberalisation of the economy have given rise to 
lowering of tariff on pharmaceutical products from  70% to 14% (Sweet, 2007).  
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 In volume this proportion is higher.  
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 Though it fulfilled its mission of procurement and distribution of medicines within Brazil, it failed in fulfilling 
other objectives such as assuring the quality of drugs, supporting technological development and local R&D.  




objectives as follows : adoption of a list of essential medicines, health-related regulation of 
medicines, promotion of rational use of medicines, scientific and technological development, 
promotion of production of medicines, safety, efficacy and quality assurance, development 
and training of human resources.  
The objectives of public health and industrial development were put forward because of 
concerns about the ability to supply safe and efficient drugs of quality to satisfy the needs of 
the population, while drawing upon local production as much as possible.  One of the first 
actions was to bring the list of essential medicines lastly listed in 1982 upto date and create in 
2001 a commission to update this information regularly. Even if at first the „Basic Pharmacy 
Program‟ had a centralized structure of public procurement, very soon the Health Ministry 
opted for a set of federal purchases for the different internal states.  
In 1999 the public agency ANVISA, the equivalent of the American FDA was created. Its 
duties consisted of monitoring the production of drugs for safety and efficiency, setting price 
ceilings and advicing the National agency of intellectual property rights when their patent are 
deposited, evaluating in particular the novelty of the patent submission.  
The same year, always with the objective of promoting the supply of medicines at an 
affordable price, the Generics Act was promulgated. It is important to note that till that date, 
like in other developing countries, in the Brazlilan market, there exists three types of 
medicines: the original innovation drug, generics and „me-too‟ drugs. The last was slightly 
different from the original drugs but contained the same active principles, had the same 
therapeutic effects, were given in the same dosage with same mode of delivery as the original 
innovation. In return, the producers of me-too drugs did not have to demonstrate the 




Unintentionally, the Generic Act elevated the safety norms and made tests of 
bioequivalence mandatory for any „me-too‟ drug to gain marketing approval unlike generics 
(Hasenclever et alii, 2000, Sweet, 2007)
28
. Therefore, the latter disappeared progressively and 
was replaced by sales of generics. In order to assure price stability, the law insisted that the 
price of generics must be at least 33% lower than that of the princeps.  
The objective of this measure is, as in a number of developed and developing countries, to 
increase the competition on the pharmaceutical and to support the consumption of generics, 
which are cheaper than the patented drugs. Instead of submitting to additional costs, via the 
realization of tests of bioequivalence and investing to increasing the quality, the efficiency 
and the safety of their drugs, the local industry was able to tap the international generics 
market. This of course did not fail to provoke strong reactions from the multinationals present 





3.2. Thailand IPR: Boosting quality rather than quantity 
From 1984 the Thai FDA launched a campaign to promote „Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP)‟ to promote the safety, efficiency and quality of drugs before market release. This is 
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 Thesear are clinical tests demonstrating that generics have the same therapeutic effects as the original drugs.  
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 These minimum standards also concern the promotion, the packaging and the marketing of generics 
(Hasenclever, 2000).  
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 D‟où des campagnes vantant la qualité des princeps et mettant en avant la qualité médiocre des génériques 
produits sur le marché brésilien.  




because the existing procedures for the inspection of local production units, locally produced 
medicines, imported drugs and those sold in pharmacies were deemed insufficient to assure 
quality.  Producers, importers and distributors were therefore required to adhere to new GMP 
standards. Thus,  the 6th  (1987-1991) and the 7th (1992-1996) national plans of economic 
and social development included programs under which the Thai authorities promoted and 
helped the local producers to adopt GMP by organizing seminars, annual training workshops 
for the personnel of private firms and public institutions, diffusion of technical documents and 
the realisation of audits in producing firms (FDA, 1999).  
The main obstacles to GMP adoption were the conditions laid down on investments, 
personnel et technical know-how and insufficient legal measures to facilitate these 
procedures. The GMP was not obligatory by law till 2004 but it was necessary to gain 
marketing approval. From 1993 onwards, a test of uniformity of content was required for 
drugs containing less than 2 milligrammes of the active principle per dose. For all imported 
drugs and for 12 drugs produced locally, tests of stability were required before registration. 
The same year, studies of bioequivalence were made mandatory for registering generic drugs.   
Monitoring and inspection of drug producers, specially those without certification of GMP 
were put in place in a transition phase during which GMP certification was not obligatory. 
Furthermore, since 1992, the Minster of Health obliged the government hospitals to purchase 
their medicines from only producers with GMP certification. The Thai FDA demanded 
pharmacies to do likewise.  
In this manner, the State tried to improve the quality of medicines produced locally by 
playing the the card of improving production conditions. By forcing the firms to conduct tests 
of bioequivalence and the hospitals and pharmacies to buy only from GMP certified 
producers, a real attempt was made to improve the quality of medicines available. Morever, 
the Health authorities edited a list of essential medicines, basing it on the WHO model et 
called upon hospitals to stock upto 80% of the medicines given in the list.  
Strenghtening the IPR regime: In 1992, when the member countries of the WTO were in 
the process of negotiating the contents of the treatise that would later emerge as TRIPS, under 
pressure from the commerce department of the USA, Thailand revised its patent law of 1979 
(WHO, 1999, Dhanarajan, 2001, Guennif et Mfuka, 2003). Before 1992, only processes were 
patentable. However, from 1992, both product and process patents were allowed, and all drugs 
invented elsewhere in the world were also patentable in Thailand. Patent protection was 
granted for a duration of 20 years, during which no generic could be produced. 
In parallel, the « Safety Monitoring Programme » was put in place the same year under 
pressure from the American representatives of trade and commerce (Dhanarajan, 2001). 
Officially the SMP has as its targets to assure the security, efficiency, and quality of products 
before the granting of marketing approval in Thailand. This program does not concern the 
entire set of medicines arriving in the market, but uniquely those for which a patent has been 
deposited elsewhere in the world between 1986 and 1991. In other words, the program covers 
chemical entities, combinations of drugs, delivery systems new to the Thai market but already 
patented elsewhere.   
This permitted health authorities to put a drug under protocol of post-marketing inspection 
for two years. During this period, the drug would not be available in the pharmacies but 
uniquely in the public hospitals and the clinics, since it was deemed that only then could 
examinations be organized to test for efficiency, safety and quality. More importantly, during 
this phase of inspection and waiting for marketing approval, all production of generics is 
prohibited.  




To sum it up, the SMP permitted producers, mainly multinationales to obtain exclusive 
rights for commercialization in public hospitals and clinics. Initially the protocol was valid for 
two years; whereas by 1993, Thailand fell under the blow of „301 Special‟ American and 
prolonged the duration of commercial exclusivity. Furthermore, firms can demand two year 
extension of SMP. At the end of these two years, they have about six months to analyze the 
data collected on the safety, efficiency and quality of the product and submits them to Thai 
FDA. Then after an additional six months, they can gain market approval. Thus, the duration 
of commercial exclusivity is finally extended to a period of 5 years, during which no local 
production or importing of generics is permitted. In other words, SMP and the law on patents 
were combined advantageously to offer exclusive commercialization rights and monopolies to 
foreign producers whose patents dated at least 1986. 
In addition to the introduction of patentability of drugs, in 1992 parallel imports were also 
banned following threats from USA to limit the imports of Thai textiles. An year after such 
banning, under renewed American pressure, the Thai government abolished compulsory 
licenses that were earlier included in the Thai Patent Act. In return, the preferential tariff 
treatment was promised for exports of jewels and wood products exported to American 
markets.    
Then came TRIPS in 1994. Five years elapsed before the Thai patent laws were amended 
to be in conformity with TRIPS, with a patent protection duration of 20 years. Conforming to 
TRIPS, the law was amended to reintroduce parallel imports in the Thai system and despite 
pressure from the US, compulsory licenses are an integral part of the Thai patent system. 
However, following TRIPS, they can be applied only in the case of national emergency. Also, 
it is very much possible de exclude patentability of drugs vital for the population and therby 
permit the production of generics of drugs in the case of health crises.  
What was the impact of these safety norms? A natural consequence was that the number of 
firms with GMP certification increased over time. In 1989, 30.4% of the producers  (58 firms) 
had GMP certification (see figure 9), including GPO. In 2000, this figure rose to 73% of firms 
(or 130 units) and by 2006, 94,4% of the producers had GMP certification.  
At the same time, this trend hid another phenomenon : a number of firms that were unable 
the bear the costs of upgrading their equipment and manufacturing units and recruiting 
qualified personnel, in order to obtain GMP certification, were forced to shut down. For 
instance, there were 191 producers in 1989 against 176 in 1999 just after the Asian crisis. The 
last count in 2006 revealed 171 local firms (ISPE, 2006).  
 




Figure 8: Percentage of GMP-certified manufacturers, 1989-2006 
 
Source : Drug Control Division and Drug Administration, Ministry of Public 
Health, 2007.  
 
A second positive impact was that Thai drugs inmproved in quality and safety and 
stimulated Thai firms to export their products. But even if the Thai market became dynamic it 
remained very small as compared to the markets of neighbouring countries like India or China 
or far-away emerging economies like Brazil. Opportunities for exports also continued to rise 
with the constitution of ASEAN regrouping around 10% of the world population and between 
1983 and 2005, exports increased 24 times growing from 255.6 million to nearly 6.2 billion 
bahts. But it must not be forgotten, that such a rise in exports was accompanied by a rise in 












Figure 9: The trade balance of the pharmaceutical sector 
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In million baths 
Source : Drug Control Division, Food and Drug Administration, MoPH. 
 
4. Discussion : Determinants of Catching up in terms of industrial competence 
 
The three countries studied, India, Brazil and Thailand have all made considerable strides 
in catching-up, but display very heterogeneous patterns.  
All three countries have local manufacturing bases producing generic formulations out of 
bulk drugs. However, only India produces biogenerics and active pharmaceutical ingredients 
that form the basis of bulk drugs. Indian firms have manufacturing bases not only in India but 
in other developed as well as developing countries (e.g. in 1977 Ranbaxy set up 
manufacturing units in Nigeria and in 2000 acquired Bayer Generic Business). 
All three countries market products of local firms in their market and export to other 
developing countries. But the zone of exports is most limited in the case of Thailand, bigger 
for Brazil and the largest for India. For instance, the Thai public unit GPO exports medicines, 
essentially in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in countries-members 
like Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos or Cambodgia whereas Brazilian firms export mainly 
within the MERCOSUR. India, on the other hand exports both to developing and developed 
country markets. Indian firms such as Ranbaxy, Cipla, Aurobindo or Matrix sell in both 
developed countries and developing countries under their own brand name. Recently for 
example, Cipla has received US FDA approval for the marketing of Zidovudine (AZT) and 
the South-African FDA for the marketing of Efavirenz under license from Mercks, both 
medicines are antiretrovirals. Before, Aurobindo, Ranbaxy and Matrix received US FDA 
approval for the antiretroviral Didanosine (ddI) or AZT
30
. 
All three countries have developed basic innovation capabilities in the form of re-
engineering skills, but are on different rungs of the value-adder ladder. The value chain in 
pharmaceuticals runs as follows from the least knowledge/value added intensive product to 
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the most knowledge intensive/value added product:  (i) formulations; (ii) bulk drugs; (iii) 
active pharmaceutical ingredients (API); generics; bio-generics; (iii) dosage formulation; drug 
delivery system; (iv) new chemical entity; (vi) niche segment drug; (vii) broad therapeutic 
segment blockbuster. All three countries have developed innovation capabilties that enable 
them to manufacture formulations and all produce bulk drugs. However, Thailand and Brazil 
are still highly dependent on imports of API, generics and biogenerics. India has developed 
considerable innovation capabilities that enable it produce API, generics, biogenerics as well 
as new dosage formulation (e.g. Ranbaxy‟s once a day dosage for Ciprofloxacin; Dr. Reddy‟s 
Fluxentine 40mg tablets) and drug delivery system (e.g. Ranbaxy‟s oral release of 
Ciprofloxacin; Dr. Reddy‟s Fluxentine 40mg tablets). However, no developing country firm 
has to this date created a new chemical entity or new drug.  
In the light of the above, one can clearly conclude, that in terms of catching-up as given by 
development of industrial competence, India is clearly in the lead, followed by Brazil, and 
finally by Thailand.  
So what are the consequences of catching-up or not catching up?  
With respect to national soverneity, India is the only country to achieve self-sufficiency 
and technical independence to a large degree. Brazil produces only a few API and Thailand 
practically none, leading them to rely largely on imports, leading in turn to a trade deficit in 
the pharmaceutical sector. There is a negative relation between national autonomy in a sector 
and benefit to foreign multinationals in the corresponding country. Brazil with its large market 
and Thailand with small but growing market have benefitted foreign producers by providing 
them with markets for the imports of formulations and API from their mother countries.  
A second consequence of catching-up is that the countries of the South have been able to 
help one another. Generic producers from India were able to supply other countries of the 
South like Brazil and Thailand, with products that were much cheaper than those offered by 
Western multinationals. In turn, emerging country and developing country markets enabled 
Indian firms not to only to augment their profit but also to develop dynamic capabilities in 
manufacturing abroad and marketing, training them to aim at developed country markets. The 
advantages offered by Indian pharmaceutical firms were not only in terms of price but also in 
terms of dosage and delivery system innovations. For example, anti-AIDS drug cocktails 
developed by Cipla, Ranbaxy and Hetero not only brought about a tremendous price reduction 
in the global market of antiretrovirals (from about 150,000$ per year per person to $350 per 
year  per person) but also reduced dosage from 12 tables to 2 tablets per day. Similarly, the 
development of a fixe-dose combination by Ranbaxy for patients suffering from both high 




Therefore, it is clear that catching-up supports national soverneity and economic 
development of South. But this leads to another moot question. Why did the three countries, 
all of which had the same technological base at the end of World War II, catch up to different 
degrees by the millennium? This question becomes particularly relevant because all three 
countries, India, Brazil and Thailand enjoyed a period of process patent regimes, when local 
firms as second innovators could take over the market from foreign multinationals. However, 
this happened significantly only in India. Why?  
Though no “sufficient conditions” have been identified for the creation of industrial 
capabilities in knowledge intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, a set of necessary 
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conditions for any developing country to catch-up in such sectors seems evident. First, there 
has to be an adequate base of skilled scientific labour, which means that the university and 
public research laboratories have to ensure the supply of a sufficient quantity and quality of 
scientists, who can generate knowledge and who can be employed by firms. Second, there has 
to be an adequate circulation of resources (information, labour, people and capital) between 
the research market where public laboratories are most active, the technology markets with 
both firms and public laboratories and the final product markets formed of manufacturing 
firms, so that there is an efficient transformation of knowledge into technology. Third, there 
must be sufficient incentives for private firms to invest in the creation of manufacturing 
capabilities and innovation. Fourth, there must be agents in the economy, the State, firms or 
financiers, who are willing to bear the costs and risks of innovation creation (Jolly and 
Ramani, 1996). Following this argument, we propose four factors to explain the catch-up 
positions of India, Brazil and Thailand: role of the State, role of the public sector and public-
private cooperation, nature of market competition and incentives generated by IPR. 
 
(i) Role of the State: Governments typically try to satisfy the first necessary condition 
through direct investment in the creation of qualified personnel through outlays in higher 
education and research. They attempt to facilitate the other conditions through appropriate 
regulation and industrial policy including IPR. 
 Though all three countries invested in higher education and research, it seems to have 
been most effective in India. Though it is often touted that the Indian Patent Act of 1970 
infused life into the Indian pharmaceutical industry, it must be viewed simply as a vital drug 
administered to a dying person, who survives only if the essential organs are functioning in 
the first place, and dies otherwise. By 1970, thanks to the major investment of the government 
in the post-independence period, a network of universities and research institutions in the 
post-independence period was generating large pools of qualified labour in the form of 
chemists, pharmacists, engineers and managers available to work in pharmaceutical firms. 
This played a vital role in supporting the growth of the private pharmaceutical industry. 
 In terms of other policies facilitating industrial competence, one can cite the „Generics 
Act‟ and the optimal and effective use of „compulsory licensing‟ in Brazil that facilated the 
strenghthening of local Brazilian firms. The latter also supported the public health system. 
Whereas, the manner in which compulsory licensing is implemented in India, it enables them 
to export essential drugs to other developing countries but does not make a significant impact 
on the local health care system. 
 In an opposite sense, the engagement of the Thai State in the initiation of norms to 
promote safety (e.g. GMP, SMP) forced local firms to exit the market and fortified the maket 
shares of foreign multinationals, even though it improved the quality of the medicines 
available.  
 
(ii) Role of public sector and public-private cooperation:  
In both Brazil and Thailand, the public sector organizations were either production or 
distribution units or both, complementing the private sector in terms augmenting the 
availability of medicines and their distribution to the patients. In India, strangely enough, the 
public sector organization designated for health care, „The Indian council of Medical Research 
(ICMR)‟ hardly played any role either in helping Indian firms or the Indian healthcare system. 
However the chemical laboratories of the „Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 




(CSIR)‟ played a crucial role in strengthening the capabilities of Indian firms through carring 
contract research for them. The chemical laboratories researched, identified and created new 
process technologies at the laboratory scale, which they transferred them to firms with 
technological capabilities in scaling them up to pilot and plant scale.  
 
(iii) Size and composition  of market under the process patent regime:  
Brazil and Thailand were strongly marked by the presence of foreign multinationals even 
during the period when they had a process patent regime. For instance, even in 1980, about 
71% of the Brazilian market was supplied by foriegn firms (Frischtak, 1989). Multinationals 
are more likely to form an implicit cartel with market sharing or mutual support for highly 
pegged prices, rather than engage in head to head competition.  
India on the other hand had a number of pharmaceutical firms at the time of the 
promulgation of the process patent regime in 1972. Within, a decade it was clear that profits 
could be increased through technological innovations. Thus, the change in the patent regime 
initiated „winner takes all‟ tournaments within the Indian market, whereby the first firm to 
commercialize the re-engineered product raked in all the profits. Often the incremental 
technological innovations continued, with a second or third innovator improving upon earlier 
re-engineered products and grabbing the market share, lowering the prices even further and 
increasing consumer welfare. Thus, while firms competed to introduce innovations in Western 
markets in one shot technology races, that ended when the first innovator patented its product, 
in India, due to the process patent regime, firms continually introduced technological 
improvements lowering the cost of production, drug prices and increasing consumer welfare. 
A serious consequence of such dynamic technology races was that Indian drug producers 
faced continual gales of technological competition in which only the most diversified or the 
most technologically competent firms survived. Thus, the Indian pharmaceutical market 
became very dynamic and competitive. 
 
(iv) Impact of IPR  
The case studies reveal that having a weak IPR regime does not automatically guarantee 
catching-up as all three countries enjoyed a period of weak patent regimes, but they were not 
able to exploit this opportunity equally. 
However, the impact of a stronger IPR regime on the behaviour of multinationals has been 
similar in the three countries. Article 7 of TRIPS stipulates that the “The protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”. Furthermore, Article 66-2 
envisages that “developed country members will provide incentives to their firms and 
institutions to transfer technology to less developed countries. In other words, in return for 
putting in place an IPR system, developing countries expected to see an improvement in their 
access to new and innovative techniques and therapeutics, improves through a significant 
technology transfer and foreign direct investment towards their region. This has not been the 
case in any of the three countries. As the case studies reveal, this is because IPR is not the sole 
determinant of technology transfer being also dependent on other factors like a good business 
climate, infrastructural facilities, quality and quantity of labour supply and vested 
monopolistic interests.  





(v) Consequences of not having deep pockets 
As may be recalled, many Thai firms had to exit the market because they could not 
bear the costs of GMP adoption. In Brazil and Thailand, firms prefer not to invest on R&D as 
the returns to investment are not deemed to high enough, which in turn locks them into a 
lower level of innovative capabilities. Even, in the Indian case, when firms are striving to 
catch-up in terms of innovation, lack of finance constrains all but the top firms.  In order to 
surmount their lack of funds to invest in R&D, Indian firms are trying to integrate in the 
global division of work, in the R&D projects of Western multnationals. New forms of 
collaboration are emerginging such as licensing out of molecules discovered by Indian firms, 
joint R&D contracts and outsourced clinical trials. In the upstream stages of drug discovery 
they take the form of licensing out and contract R&D.  In the downstream stages of drug 
commercialization they take the form of conducting clinical trials for the innovations of 
multinationals. NPIL has preferred to act as like a specialist supplier and is also more spread 
out than Wockhardt having activities involving contract manufacturing, R&D collaboration 
and clinical trials. Neither of the two firms is involved in licensing-out.   
 
 Finally, it may be recalled that catching-up involves two components: development of 
industrial competence and accessibility to medicines and healthcare. Though the focus of this 
paper has been on the former, it is worthwhile to cast an eye on the relative positions of the 
three countries with respect to the latter as summarized in table 6.   
It shows that while India is much ahead of Brazil and Thailand in terms of its production 
and innovation capabilities, in terms of healthcare, it cuts a sorry figure with respect to the 
other two countries. Though prices of medicines and diagnostics are among the lowest in the 
world in India, the distribution of the same to the people needs to be improved. Dutta (2007) 
notes that in 2002 only seven countries in the world had lower public expenditures on health 
than India and they were Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
Due to very limited coverage of insurance system (both social and private), along with low 
government expenditure, 75% of the health expenditures in India is paid out of the pockets of 
patients. On the other hand, in Thailand, almost 95% of the population is covered by social 
security. India has a very dismal record in comparison. Brazil is often hailed as a as a 
healthcare success story as it has improved some health indicators such as mortality rates 
(from 11 in 1980 to 5.6 per 1000 in 2001) and the immunization coverage has reached more 
than 95%. Although access to medicines is still a public health problem, Brazil has achieved 
good results especially with respect to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
The above brief look clearly drives home the point, that creation of industrial capabilties 
and ensuring healthcare for all, are two different faces of the same coin of catching-up. The 
degree of catching-up on one aspect is not automatically correlated to the degree of catching-
up on the other. Moreover, policies which promote one part of catching-up need not promote 















The present article attempted to examine the determinants of catching-up in the 
pharmaceutical sector through a detailed examination of three countries: India, Brazil and 
Thailand, in different stages of the catch-up process, with a focus on the role of IPR. It 
showed that while IPR plays an important role, other factors like State policy in terms of 
investment in public research, regulation, nature of market competition, public-private 
cooperation and consumer preferences modulate the final impact. Thus, having a weak IPR 
regime is not sufficient to assure catching-up and having a strong IPR or TRIPS, though not 
favourable to catching up, need not pose an unsurmountable obstacle if the other factors are 
correspondingly fine-tuned. In particular, it is necessary to examine how flexibilities 
embedded in TRIPS can be exploited in combination with other national investment, policy 
and regulation as well as international initiatives, to improve industrial capabilties. 
Multilateral South-South trade and cooperation initiatives can also play an important 
complementary role. Finally, the nexus between IPR and access to medicines is not so clear 
cut and there is a need for a better understanding of the conditions under which a stronger IPR 
regime will lead to a better access to medicines.  
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